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I. INTRODUCTION
Research findings in behavioral psychology have fundamentally
transformed the way we approach and solve legal problems.' In recent years,
behavioral psychology has lost some of its luster due to the inability of
researchers to replicate some of the central findings in the field.2 The so-called
"replication crisis" raises concerns about the reliability of individual
psychological studies3 and general criticism of the reliance on null hypothesis
significance testing ("NHST") in experimental psychology.' The replication
crisis is largely viewed as a problem limited to experimental social science, and
the existing literature on the crisis focuses on how to fix problems in these fields.
Yet the crisis, particularly the methodological criticisms of NHST, can help us
both frame problems in other markets that rely on statistical modeling as well as
understand the limits of existing legal solutions. This article applies these
insights to one such market that is widely recognized as broken but where there is
little consensus on exactly what the problem is and how to fix it: the credit rating
agency market.
In the aftermath of the financial crisis of 2008, academics and lawmakers
broadly agreed that credit rating agencies were partially responsible for the
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1See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler, LibertarianPaternalismIs Not an Oxymoron,
70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1159 (2003) (an early paper from Sunstein and Thaler arguing for a new
paradigm in rulemaking based on insights from behavioral psychology); Donald C. Langevoort,
Taming the Animal Spirits of the Stock Market: A BehavioralApproach to Securities Regulation,
97 Nw. U. L. REV. 135 (2002) (applying insights from behavioral finance and economics to the
regulation of financial markets after Enron); Stephanos Bibas, PleaBargaining Outside the Shadow
of Trial, 117 HARv. L. REV. 2463 (2004) (using insights from behavioral psychology to challenge
conventional wisdom about motives underlying pre-trial plea bargaining).
2 See Kristin Firth, David A. Hoffman & Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, Law and Psychology Grows Up,
Goes Online, and Replicates, 15 J. EMIImcAL LEGAL STUD. 320, 334-53 (2018) [hereinafter Law
and Psychology Grows Up] (describing the replication crisis as a source of skepticism about the
value of psychological research in legal analysis).
3 See id.
4 See Joseph Simmons, Leif Nelson & Uri Simonsohn, False-PositivePsychology: Undisclosed
Flexibility in Data Collection and Analysis Allow PresentingAnything as Significant, 22 PSYCHOL.
Sci. 1359 (2011) [hereinafter Simmons et al., False-Positive Psychology]; see also Andrew
Gelman & Erik Loken, The Garden of Forking Paths: Why Multiple Comparisons Can Be a
Problem, Even When There Is No "Fishing Expedition" or "P-hacking" and the Research
Hypothesis was Posited Ahead of Time (Nov. 14, 2013) (unpublished) (available online at
http://www.stat.columbia.edu/-gelman/research/unpublished/phacking.pdf)
[hereinafter Gelman
& Loken, Garden ofForking Paths].
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collapse of global financial markets.5 Legal scholars, however, disagreed about
why the rating agencies failed to predict the crisis. Competing explanations
included: insufficient oversight of the rating agencies by the Securities and
Exchange Commission ("SEC");6 too much regulation, which led to rent-seeking
and excessive reliance on credit ratings; 7 and a compensation model that
incentivized rating agencies to rate securities consistent with issuer expectations.8
Though distinct, these descriptive accounts are unified in their understanding of
the problem in the ratings market as external to the ratings process. In contrast,
this article suggests the problems in the ratings industry are best understood as
internalto the credit ratings process.
Modern credit rating agencies rely on sophisticated statistical models to
analyze and rate debt offerings. 9 Analysts at rating agencies face complex design
decisions in developing these models, including how much data to collect and
which statistical techniques to use. In managing these decisions, this article
suggests that rating analysts may be driven by their own subjective bias to build
The story is detailed at great length in the sources cited below, but to briefly summarize: Standard
& Poor's, Moody's, and Fitch systematically underestimated the risk that mortgages backing or
referenced by residential mortgage backed securities ("RMBS") and collateralized debt obligations
("CDO") would default and rated these securities as relatively risk free. Rating agencies'
assessment of RMBS and CDOs as safe investments fueled demand for these securities, which, in
turn, allowed mortgage lenders to finance excessively risky mortgages that would ultimately
default in high numbers, precipitating an international credit crisis. See, e.g., FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY
COMM'N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT 146 (2011) ("[t]he machine churning out CDOs

would not have worked without the stamp of approval given to these deals by the three leading
rating agencies: Moody's, S&P, and Fitch"); Jeffrey Mains, DowngradingRating Agency Reform,
81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 749, 754 n.16 (2013) [hereinafter Manns, Downgrading] (collecting

empirical studies documenting the failures of the rating agencies)
6 See, e.g., Lynn Bai, The Performance Disclosuresof Credit Rating Agencies: Are They Effective

Reputational Sanctions?, 7 N.Y.U. J. L. & Bus. 47, 97-98 (2010); Milosz Gudzowski, Note,
Mortgage Credit Ratings and the FinancialCrisis: The Need for a State-Run Mortgage Security
CreditRating Agency, 2010 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 245, 264-71 (2010).
See, e.g., Mark Flannery, Joel Houston & Frank Partnoy, CreditDefault Swap Spreads as Viable
Substitutes for Credit Ratings, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 2085, 2086-89 (2010); Jonathan R. Macey,
The Politicization ofAmerican Corporate Governance, 1 VA. L. & Bus. REV. 10, 21-24 (2006);
Frank Partnoy, Overdependence on Credit Ratings was a Primary Cause of the Crisis, in THE
PANIC OF 2008: CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES, AND IMPLICATIONS FOR REFORM 116, 116-31 (Lawrence

Mitchell et al. eds., 2010).
8 Yair Listokin & Benjamin Taibleson, If You Misrate, Then You Lose: Improving Credit Rating
Accuracy Through Incentive Compensation, 27 YALE J. REG. 91, 94-95 (2010); Jeffrey Mains,
Rating Risk After the Subprime Mortgage Crisis: A User Fee Approach for Rating Agency
Accountability, 87 N.C. L. REV. 1011, 1015-19 (2009).
1 See, e.g., Ingo Fender & John Kiff, CDO RatingMethodology: Some Thoughts on Model Risk and
its Implications 3-8 (Bank for Int'l Settlements, Working Paper No.
163, 2004),
http://www.bis.org/publ/workl63.pdf
(describing differences between Moody's binomial

expansion technique and monte-carlo simulation to rate CDOs); Frank Partnoy, How and Why
Credit Rating Agencies Are Not Like Other Gatekeepers, in FINANCIAL GATEKEEPERS: CAN THEY
PROTECT INVESTORS? 59, 76-78 (Yasuyuki Fuchita & Robert Litan eds., 2006) [hereinafter Partnoy,
Gatekeepers] (describing Standard & Poor's use of monte-carlo simulations to establish the default
thresholds for a proposed pool of assets in a CDO to achieve particular ratings).
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models that confirm their a priori beliefs about default risk. To make this case,
this article relies on the descriptive framework created by critics of NHST
specifically in the field of behavioral psychology.
Null hypothesis significance testing is a statistical test commonly used in
experimental science to determine if a causal relationship exists between two
variables and is central to many psychological studies. Critics of NHST contend
that experimental psychology placed too much faith in NHST and failed to
adequately constrain the risk of error NHST poses.'0
These critics have
developed a framework to understand problems with NHST that rests on two
important insights about the risk of error in statistical modeling more generally:
(1) "researcher degrees of freedom," including flexibility in data selection and
analysis, can lead researchers to underestimate the existence of false positives;
and (2) a researcher's "implicit bias" towards finding statistical significance may
lead the researcher to pursue a path that appears data-driven but is, in fact, biased
towards finding false positives even without bad faith or malicious intent." This
article's central claims are that the criticisms of NHST in behavioral psychology
are equally applicable to the statistical models rating agencies use to rate debt
offerings and also that rating agency errors are best understood as the product of
rating analysts' degrees of freedom (i.e., flexibility in data selection and model
choice in model development) and subjective bias.
To be sure, this article's central claims should not be taken to mean that
rating agency errors are in fact the product of subjective bias. Rather, this article
contends that rating agency errors are best understood as the product of
subjective bias because errors in the ratings process can be rationalized ex post in
a manner that makes it difficult for regulators, law enforcement, or private
litigants to determine if the errors were the product of bad faith or honest
mistake. The credit rating agency reforms in Dodd-Frank 2 rely on regulators'
ability to distinguish between bad faith and honest mistake to curb abuse in the
ratings market. This article attempts to show this reliance is misplaced and, in
the absence of evidence that rating agencies are unambiguously operating in bad
faith, regulators will not be able to detect and discourage objective mistakes in
the ratings process.
This article concludes by suggesting some reforms the SEC can make
within the current framework of Dodd-Frank that would result in less biased and
more accurate credit ratings. There is an emerging consensus that the rating
agency reforms in Dodd-Frank are insufficient to address problems with the
ratings market." This article agrees with this consensus but suggests that the
10 See Simmons et al., False-PositivePsychology, supra note 4, at 1359.
" See id.; Gelman & Loken, Garden ofForking Paths, supra note 4, at 2.
12 See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124
Stat. 1376 (2010).
13 See Frank Partnoy, What's (Still) Wrong with Credit Ratings,
92 WASH. L. REv. 1407 (2017),
[hereinafter Partnoy, Wrong]; Manns, Downgrading, supra note 5, at 750; Claire Hill, Limits of
Dodd-Frank'sRating Agency Reform, 15 CHAP. L. REv. 133, 133 (2011) [hereinafter Hill, Limits];
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problems with Dodd-Frank are ones of implementation, not design. This article
suggests two reforms to rating agency regulation, which can be achieved within
the current framework of Dodd-Frank through interpretive guidance or formal
rulemaking: (1) liberalizing the application process to become a nationally
recognized statistical rating organization ("NRSRO");"' and (2) making rating
agencies compete to preserve their NRSRO status. Specifically, the SEC should
propose rules that define integrity and accuracy relative to the performance of
other rating agencies and revoke an agency's license for a class of securities if its
performance is poor. This article explains how the SEC can effectuate these
reforms and addresses complications with each.
This article proceeds in four parts: Part II describes the replication crisis
in behavioral psychology and the critiques of the use of NHST by behavioral
psychologists. Part III applies the insights of NHST critics to the context of
credit ratings by walking the reader through the creation of a simple predictive
model using machine learning techniques and public data. The goal in Part III is
to show the reader how rating analysts can manipulate flexibility in data
collection and model choice to build predictive models that underestimate default
risk. Part IV uses the model developed in Part III as the subject of a hypothetical
regulatory investigation. Part IV attempts to show that the reforms in DoddFrank, as currently applied, are insufficient to prevent rating analysts from
making objective and consequential errors in the ratings process. Finally, Part V
suggests modest reforms within the current framework of Dodd-Frank to
minimize the effects of subjective bias in model design.
II. RESEARCHER DEGREES OF FREEDOM AND THE REPLICATION
CRISIS IN BEHAVIORAL PSYCHOLOGY
The field of behavioral psychology has been plagued in recent years by
the so-called "replication crisis": the failure of many foundational results in the
field to replicate under different experimental settings." Fallout from the crisis

Carrie Guo, Note, CreditRating Agency Reform: A Review of Dodd-FrankSection 933(B) 's Effect
(Or Lack Thereof Since Enactment, 1 COLUM B.L. REv. 184, 187 (2016) [hereinafter Guo, Credit
Rating Agency Reform].
14 "NRSRO" is the formal designation federal law provides for agencies licensed to issues ratings
by the SEC.
15 Though there have been many articles on the crisis, perhaps the most notable is the Open Science
Collaboration study reporting the results of attempting to replicate 100 published experimental
findings and finding only a small percentage of statistically significant results were replicable. The
Open Science Collaboration study was the subject of fierce debate between the studies' authors and
prominent behavioral psychologists such as Daniel Gilbert. See generally Open Science

Collaboration, Estimating the Reproducibility of PsychologicalScience, 349 SCIENCE aac4716-1
(2015). For the full exchange, see generally Daniel Gilbert et al., Comment on "Estimating the

Reproducibility of Psychological Science", 351 SCIENCE 1037-a (2016); Christopher Anderson et
al., Response to Comment on "Estimating the Reproducibility of Psychological Science", 351
SCIENCE

1037b (2016); Daniel Gilbert et al., A Response to the Reply to Our Technical Comment
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has led to deep skepticism among some academics of novel experimental results
in the field;'" skepticism that is based on both the weak replicability of past
results and concern that flexibility in experimental design can lead to engineered
and incorrect results. This second sentiment is perhaps best captured by two
recent articles: Joseph Simmons, Leif Nelson and Uni Simonsohn's 2011 paper
False-PositivePsychology; and Andrew Gelman and Erik Loken's 2013 paper
The Garden ofForking Paths.1"
In False-PositivePsychology, Simmons, Nelson, and Simonsohn explain
how flexibility in data collection and analysis in NHST can lead to the incorrect
rejection of the null hypothesis (i.e., reporting false-positives as true positives).
NHST is an inferential statistical test commonly used in experimental research to
test a hypothesis (e.g., that a carbohydrate-free diet causes weight loss). The
basic NHST procedure is to formulate a null hypothesis (carbohydrate-free diet
has no effect on weight loss), define a test statistic (average weight loss), observe
the distribution of the test statistic across a population sample, and determine the
probability of observing a result as or more extreme than the observed test
statistic (commonly referred to as the "p-value"). If the p-value is less than a
predefined threshold for significance (typically 5%), then the null hypothesis can
be rejected. Rejection of the null hypothesis does not mean that the alternative
hypothesis is true, but rather the likelihood of the alternative hypothesis being
false is low (i.e., it is unlikely the test yielded a false positive or type II error).
However, as Simmons, Nelson, and Simonsohn argue, "despite the nominal
endorsement of a maximum false-positive rate of 5% (i.e., p < .05), current
standards for disclosing details of data collection and analyses [in psychological
research] make false positives vastly more likely." 9 The authors identify the
source of high false positive rates as researcherdegrees offreedom:
In the course of collecting and analyzing data, researchers
have many decisions to make: Should more data be collected? Should
some observations be excluded? Which conditions should be combined
and which ones compared? Which control variables should be
considered? Should specific measures be combined or transformed or
both?

on "Estimating the Reproducibility of Psychological Science" (unpublished) (available online at
http://gking.harvard.edu/files/gking/files/gkpw response tooscrebutal.pdf).
16

See,

e.g.,

STATISTICAL

MODELING,

CAUSAL

INFERENCE,

AND

SOCIAL

SCIENCE

BLOG,

http://www.andrewgelman.com (last visited Sept. 14, 2018). For an extended post on the evolution
of the crisis, see Andrew Gelman, What Has Happened Down Here is the Winds Have Changed,
STATISTICAL MODELING, CAUSAL INFERENCE, AND SOCIAL SCIENCE BLOG (Sept.

21, 2016, 9:03

AM),
http://andrewgelman.com/2016/09/21/what-has-happened-down-here-is-the-winds-havechanged/. Few have chronicled the replication crisis and its implications better than Andrew
Gelman, whose work is generally available on his blog.
1 See Simmons et al., False-PositivePsychology, supra note 4, at 1359-66.
1 See Gelman & Loken, Garden ofForking Paths, supra note 4.
1 Simmons et al., False-PositivePsychology, supra note 4, at 1359.
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It is rare, and sometimes impractical, for researchers to make
all these decisions beforehand. Rather, it is common (and accepted
practice) for researchers to explore various analytic alternatives, to
search for a combination that yields "statistical significance," and to
then report only what "worked." The problem, of course, is that the
likelihood of at least one (of many) analyses producing a falsely
positive finding at the 5% level is necessarily greater than 5 %.20
Simmons, Nelson, and Simonsohn argue that exploiting researcher
degrees of freedom may not be the product of "malicious intent, but rather the
result of two factors: (a) ambiguity in how best to make these decisions, and (b)
the researcher's desire to find a statistically significant result." 2 ' To demonstrate
how flexibility in experimental design can result in high false positive rates, the
authors tested the following four researcher degrees of freedom on 15,000
simulated samples randomly drawn from a normal distribution: "(a) choosing
among dependent variables, (b) choosing sample size, (c) using covariates, and
(d) reporting subsets of experimental conditions." 22 The authors tested each of
these conditions on each sample for statistical significance with various p-values.
The results showed that combining all four researcher degrees of freedom results
in rejecting the null hypothesis in 610% of cases (p < .05), which results in a falsepositive rate of at least 61%.23 With such high false positive rates, "[a]
researcher is more likely to falsely detect a significant effect by just using these
four common researcher degrees of freedom." 24
Simmons, Nelson, and
Simonsohn then exploit these researcher degrees of freedom in a mock study of
their own and find significant results that are likely false (certain songs make
listeners feel younger) and definitely false (certain songs make listeners
younger).25
In the Garden of Forking Paths, Gelman and Loken expand on
Simmons, Nelson, and Simonsohn's work and introduce the following taxonomy
of test procedures:
1) Simple classical test based on a unique test statistic, T, which when
applied to the observed data yields T(y).
2) Classical test pre-chosen from a set of possible tests: thus, T(y;q),
with preregistered 9. For example, 9 might correspond to choices of
control variables in a regression, transformations, and data coding and
excluding rules, as well as the decision of which main effect or
interaction to focus on.

20
21

22
23
24
25

Id.
Id.

Id. at 1360.

See id. at 1361.
Id.
See id. at 1360.
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3) Researcher degrees of freedom without "fishing": computing a
single test based on the data, but in an environment where a different
test would have been performed given different data; thus T(y;p(y)),
where the function p(-) is observed in the observed case.
4) "Fishing": computing T(y;pj) for j=1,..J: that is, performing J tests
and then reporting the best result given the data, thus T (y; vbest(y))26
Per Gelman and Loken, researchers may still exploit researcher degrees
of freedom even if they are not explicitly fishing for statistical significance. 27 To
illustrate, Gelman and Loken examine Alec Beall and Jessica Tracy's 2013 paper
Women Are More Likely to Wear Red or Pink at Peak Fertility.28 Gelman and
Loken contend that the authors of the study exploited several researcher degrees
of freedom to arrive at their conclusion.
First, in selecting the sample, the authors included a sizeable percentage
of women who did not fit their selection criteria (the criteria specified that
women should be younger than forty and more than five days away from the
onset of menses) and excluded women who lacked confidence in answering how
close they were to their menstrual cycle. 29 Second, multiple hypotheses could
have supported the authors' finding of a statistically significant pattern:
[T]he authors found a statistically significant pattern after combining
red and pink, but had they found it only for red, or only for pink, this
would have fit their theories too. In their words: "The theory we were
testing is based on the idea that red and shades of red (such as the
pinkish swellings seen in ovulating chimpanzees, or the pinkish skin
tone observed in attractive and healthy human faces) are associated
with sexual interest and attractiveness." Had their data popped out with
a statistically significant difference on pink and not on red, that would
have been news too. And suppose that white and gray had come up as
the more frequent colors? One could easily argue that more bland
colors serve to highlight the pink colors of a (European-colored) face. 30
Finally, the authors' definition of "peak fertility" as days six through
fourteen of the menstrual cycle seemed to be contingent on the data because
different sources prescribe different ranges and there does not appear to be an
accepted standard range in the literature. 3 1 Gelman and Loken argue though the
authors may not be fishing, they start with a strong subjective hypothesis and
implicitly choose routes in the "garden of forking paths" of experimental design
Gelman & Loken, Garden ofForking Paths, supra note 4, at 2.
See id.
28 See generally Alec Beall & Jessica Tracy, Women Are More Likely to Wear Red or Pink at Peak
Fertility, 24 PSYCHOL. SCI. 1837, 1837-41 (2013).
29 See Gelman & Loken, Garden ofForking Paths, supra note 7, at 8.
30
Id at 9.
26

27

31 See id.
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that reinforce their a prioribeliefs and steer them towards statistical significance:
When we say an analysis was subject to multiple comparisons
or "researcher degrees of freedom," this does not require that the
people who did the analysis were actively trying out different tests in a
search for statistical significance. Rather, they can be doing an analysis
which at each step is contingent on the data. The researcher degrees of
freedom do not feel like degrees of freedom because, conditional on the
data, each choice appears to be deterministic. But if we average over
all possible data that could have occurred, we need to look at the entire
garden of forking paths and recognize how each path can lead to
statistical significance in its own way. 32

III. RATING ANALYST DEGREES OF FREEDOM
Although concerns about researcher degrees of freedom in behavioral
psychology seem far removed from the business of credit ratings, there are
striking parallels between the work of rating analysts and behavioral
psychologists. Rating agencies use statistical models to rate debt instruments.
As the complexity of debt instruments has grown in the past few decades, the
models rating agencies use to rate these instruments have become increasingly
sophisticated. In developing quantitative models and using these models to rate
debt instruments, rating analysts, like behavioral psychologists, face challenging
design decisions. These design decisions do not necessarily have correct
solutions and resolving each provides rating analysts with degrees of freedom in
the model development process. Rating analysts can exploit this freedom,
intentionally or not, to build models that significantly underestimate default risk.
In the legal literature on credit ratings, rating agency methodologies are
typically discussed at an abstract level and few scholars engage with the actual
models rating agencies use or the dynamics of building predictive models.33 Part
III seeks to provide the reader with a more detailed understanding of how rating
analysts build predictive models and how the choices analysts make in the model
development process can impact the accuracy of a predictive model. This part
provides background on the ratings process, walks the reader through the creation
of a simple model using machine learning techniques and public data, and then
summarizes evidence from post-financial crisis litigation and empirical work
about subjective bias in rating agency models.
A. Background on the Ratings Process and the Use of Quantitative Methods
to Rate Debt
Rating agencies, such as Standard & Poor's and Moody's, assign letter
32
33

Id. at 10-11.
A notable exception is Frank Partnoy, whose recent work is described in detail infra Part III.
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grades to debt instruments. These letter grades correspond to the rating agency's
belief about the risk of a particular debt instrument, with higher letter grades
corresponding to lower risk and lower letter grades corresponding to higher risk.
The specific meaning of "risk," however, varies with the rating agency. For
example, Standard & Poor's ratings correspond to the probability that a particular
debt instrument will default and not pay out in full;3 4 whereas Moody's ratings
correspond to the loss an investor can expect with respect to a particular debt
instrument given its default probability.35 Thus, a "AAA" rating from Standard
& Poor's with respect to a series of corporate bonds indicates that the corporation
issuing the bonds is likely to meet its financial commitments;3 6 while an "Aaa"
rating from Moody's means the expected loss of the same corporate bonds is
very small.3 7
Rating agencies primarily rely on quantitative methods to assign ratings
to debt instruments. The complexity of the methods used typically mirrors the
complexity of the debt instrument that is being rated. For example, the
techniques rating agencies use to rate traditional corporate bonds are relatively
simple.3 8 By contrast, more complex instruments, such as asset-backed securities
("ABS") or CDOs, require more sophisticated techniques. ABS are securities
issued by a trust that are backed by the stream of payments from a pool of
financial assets such as residential mortgage loans.3 9 ABS issuances are
commonly offered in tiers (or tranches) where each tranche carries a different
rating and yield. Similarly, CDOs are tiered securities issued by trusts and
collateralized by debt securities such as ABS tranches.
Unlike a corporate bond, in analyzing the default risk of complex
instruments like CDOs or ABS, rating agencies consider more than just the
default risk of a single entity. Rating agencies consider, at a minimum, the
default risk of the individual assets in a CDO or ABS, the correlation risk
between assets in the pool, and how default and correlation risk affect the
likelihood that a CDO or ABS will be able to meet financial commitments to
investors in each tranche. Two examples of the kinds of complex models rating
agencies used to rate these assets are Moody's Binomial Expansion Technique
("BET") and Standard & Poor's CDO Evaluator-both used to rate CDOs.
Moody's pioneered an early way to assess the risk of CDOs twenty years
ago with its BET model. The BET model turned a diverse pool of correlated
34 See S&P Global Ratings Definitions, STANDARD & POOR'S FIN. SERVS. (Apr. 19, 2018)

http://www.standardandpoors.com/en US/web/guest/article/-/view/sourceld/504352.
35

See

MOODY'S

INVESTORS

SERV.,

RATING

SYMBOLS

AND

DEFINITIONS

http://www.moodys.com/researchdocumentcontentpage.aspx?docid=PBC_79004

5,

13

(2018),

[hereinafter

MOODY'S RATING DEFINITIONS].

36 See S&P GlobalRatings Definitions, supra note 34.
37 See MOODY'S RATINGS DEFINITIONS,

supra note 35.

38 See Partnoy, Wrong, supra note 13, at 28-36 (detailing Standard & Poor's current corporate

methodology).
39 Where ABS are collateralized by residential mortgages, the securitizations are commonly
referred to as RMBS.
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CDO assets into a hypothetical pool of uncorrelated assets with a simple
binomial default distribution. 40
The BET model then calculated the total
expected loss for all potential default scenarios in a securitization and checked
this value against empirically derived expected loss rates to determine the rating
for a CDO tranche.
Moody's BET model was relatively simple but somewhat inflexible.42
Several years after Moody's BET model hit the market, Standard & Poor's
developed its CDO Evaluator, which was a more complex and modem approach
that rated CDOs using monte-carlo simulation. 43 Monte-carlo simulation allows
one to repeatedly simulate the performance of a random event (flipping a coin,
for example, or making monthly payments on a mortgage) to predict the
likelihood of a certain outcome (obtaining tails or the likelihood that a mortgage
defaults at a certain time after origination)." Standard & Poor's CDO Evaluator
used monte-carlo simulation along with empirically derived data on correlation
risk and default probabilities of rated assets to rate CDOs.
The BET model and CDO Evaluator are distinct approaches to modeling
default risk of CDOs but share features common to all predictive models: each
relies on data (expected loss rates in the case of the BET model and default and
correlation tables in the case of CDO Evaluator) and a predictive method
(binomial distribution in the case of the BET model and monte-carlo simulation
in the case of CDO Evaluator) to make predictions. In choosing a predictive
method and making assumptions about expected loss or correlation risk based on
data, rating analysts-like behavioral psychologists-face complex decisions
including: How should they model the default risk of individual assets pooled
together in a securitization? How should they model the default correlation
between these assets? How should they model pool default risk based on the
default and correlation risk of assets in the pool? How much data should they
collect to build these models?
The next section walks the reader through two of these design
decisions-data selection and model choice-in the context of a hypothetical
model and shows how each design decision can ultimately bias the predictions of
a model.
B. Rating Analyst Degrees of Freedom in the Context of a
Hypothetical ABS Model
A central claim in this article is that degrees of freedom and subjective
A bell-shaped curve for a binary outcome.
See ARTURO CIFUENTES & GERARD O'CONNOR, MOODY'S STRUCTURED FIN. SPECIAL
TE BINOMIAL EXPANSION METHOD APPLIED TO CBO/CLO ANALYSIS, at 2-4 (1996).
42 See Fender & Kiff, supra note 9, at 3.
43 See id. at 22.
44 See id. at 3.
45 See id. at 3-8; see also Partnoy, Gatekeepers, supra note 9, at 76-78.
40

41

REPORT,
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bias in the model development process leads rating analysts to create predictive
models that are biased towards finding fewer defaults. To illustrate this point,
this section walks the reader through the creation of a simple model to predict the
default risk of a single tranche ABS collateralized by unsecured personal loans.
The hypothetical ABS model will be created by using classic techniques from
machine learning and publicly available loan data. 6 I opt for machine learning
methods over other techniques such as monte-carlo simulation for two reasons.
First, classic machine learning methods (as opposed to black-box methods) are
relatively straightforward and the machine learning libraries this article relies on
to build this model are publicly available. Second, while rating agencies used
simulation-based models and mathematical models to make up for scant data in
the past, with the advent of "big data," rating agencies may turn to machine
learning methods designed for larger data sets to build newer models. 7
The public data this article uses consists of unsecured loans originated
and serviced by Lending Club. Lending Club makes unsecured personal loans
between $1,000 and $40,000 and makes loan performance and reject data
publicly available.
Lending Club securitizes most of its portfolio and thus its data is useful
in building a model to rate an ABS of unsecured personal loans. The specific
Lending Club dataset used is a common subset of Lending Club's accepted loans
used in instructional courses on machine learning.4 9
The basic paradigm in supervised machine learning is to train a
predictive model based on a data set in which the target variable is known. Once
identified, the data set is split into a training subset-on which the model is
built-and a test or holdout subset-on which the model is tested for accuracy.
As background, the data set consists of 466,257 loans originated and serviced by
Lending Club between 2009 and 2014. The entire data set includes active loans,
which are still performing, and inactive loans, which are no longer performing
due to either full performance or nonperformance. Nonperforming inactive loans
are categorized as "bad loans" because these loans have generally defaulted or
been charged off.
The goal is to build a model that will predict the number of defaults in a
single tranche ABS of unsecured personal loans. Such a model needs to train on
data with completed performance-that is, loans for which the outcome is
The data files I used to build these models are available online at
http://static.turi.condatasets/lendingclub/loanStats.csv.
47 In fact, there is an emerging literature on the use of machine learning methods in credit-risk
analysis. See Amir Khandani, Adlar Kim & Andrew Lo, Consumer Credit-Risk Models Via
Machine-LearningAlgorithms, 34 J. BANKING& FIN. 2767 (2010).
48 For the complete set of Lending Club's publicly available data, visit Lending Club Statistics,
LENDINGCLUB, http://www.lendingclub.com/info/download-data.action
(last visited Sept. 14,
2018).
49 Andrew Bruce, Prediction of Loan Default with ClassificationModel, TURI (May 27, 2015),
http://turi.com/learn/gallery/notebooks/predict-loan-default.html.
For the specific code used for
this article, see GITHUB, http://github.com/vamarishnu/Rating-Paper (last visited Sept. 14, 2018).
46
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known-so, first, the data will be split into inactive and active loans. The active
loans will serve as the portfolio in the hypothetical single tranche ABS to be
rated with the predictive model. Below is a portfolio-level summary of the active
loan data:
ACTIVE LOANS
Number of loans = 343,680
Average loan amount = $14,855
Average term = 43 months
Average interest rate = 13%

The inactive loan data will be used to build a model to predict number of
defaults in the hypothetical ABS.
Below is a summary of the basic
characteristics of the inactive loan data:
INACTIVE LOANS
Number of loans = 122,607
Number of defaulted loans = 23,150
Average loan amount = $12,809
Average term = 40 months
Average interest rate = 13%

The next two sections walk the reader through the creation of this
hypothetical ABS model. In order to simplify the analysis, assume the following:
(1) assets in the pool perform independently and there is no correlation between
their default risk; (2) to assign a rating we only need to measure expected
defaults in the pool as opposed to more complex outputs such as expected loss
and probability of default; and (3) lower expected defaults generally equals a
higher rating. 5 o These simplifying assumptions reduce rating analyst degrees of

freedom and help us explore how analysts can exploit two degrees of freedom as
well as data and model selection in rating analysis.
1. Freedom in Data Selection
Following the basic machine learning paradigm, the inactive loan data
must first be split into training and test subsets. An initial degree of freedom that
rating analysts have in building a predictive model is deciding what data to use to
build the model. To illustrate the impact that different underlying data can have
50 These assumptions are meant to simplify the analysis in this section and not to suggest these
design decisions are wise. Indeed, one should definitely not assume assets in the pool perform
independently as inaccurate correlation assumptions are widely regarded as one of the fundamental
mistakes rating agencies made in rating RMBS and CDOs. See Partnoy, Gatekeepers, supra note
9, at 78; Felix Salmon, Recipe For Disaster: The Formula That Killed Wall Street, WIRED (Feb.
23, 2009), http://www.wired.com/2009/02/wp-quant/ (discussing the pervasive use of the Gaussian
Copula for estimating default correlations in structured finance prior to the financial crisis).

2019]

RATING ANALYST DEGREES OFFREEDOM

347

on predictions, we will iterate through different training/test ratios in order to
build the ABS model." To isolate the impact of modifying the training and test
subsets, analysis in this section will be limited to a single model logistic
regression, commonly used to predict a binary outcome from a set of independent
variables. It is common to use 80% of a data set to train a model and 20% of the
data set to test the accuracy of the model (an 80/20 ratio). As Figure 1 shows,
changing the amount of data the model is trained on by using different splitting
ratios can impact the number of predicted defaults:
FIGURE 1: Defaults Predicted for Active Loan Portfolio

1

Figure 1 shows the number of defaults predicted for the portfolio of
active loans from a logistic regression model trained on the inactive loan data.
The x-axis reflects the partitioning ratio between training and test subsets as a
percentage of the inactive loan data set. Figure 1 additionally shows that the
rather unconventional training/test ratio of 40/60-as opposed to the traditional
ratio of 80/20-predicts the fewest number of defaults. The most important
question, however, is whether a 40/60 training/test ratio is defensible. Perhaps
unsurprisingly, the answer requires us to precisely define what we want the
model to accomplish.
There are different metrics we can use to examine the validity of a model
that predicts a binary or discrete outcome. These metrics include accuracy (the
percentage of defaults accurately predicted in the test data), precision (ratio of
true positives over true positive plus false positives), and recall (ratio of true
" One problem with this approach is the accuracy of the model will be tested against different test
sets, so we will not be making an "apples to apples" comparison in evaluating the accuracy of

models built on different data sets. The purpose of this exercise is to illustrate how a rating analyst
can exploit freedom in data selection to build inaccurate models. The consequences of poor design
choices-such as this one-are explored in some detail infra Part IV.
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positive over true positives plus false negatives). The accuracy metric gives us a
general impression of our model's accuracy, but the accuracy score is agnostic
about the directionality of errors. The metrics of precision and recall provide
measures of the two kinds of errors available: false positives and false negatives.
Because the model is trained to predict defaults, a false positive is inaccurately
predicting a loan will default when in actuality the loan did not default. A high
precision score means fewer false positives. By contrast, a false negative
indicates that we incorrectly predicted a loan will not default and in actuality the
loan did default. False negatives are measured by recall. A risk averse rating
agency would likely worry much more about false negatives (failing to predict a
loan will default) than false positives (inaccurately predicting a loan will default).
Table 1 shows the accuracy, precision, and recall scores for various splits of the
training and test data and predicted defaults for our hypothetical ABS:
TABLE 1: Active Loan Portfolio Training/Test Split Ratios
and Corresponding Default Prediction Rates
Split

Accuracy

Precision

Recall

Predicted
Defaults

40/60

0.663726

0.305885

0.609709

136,721

10/90

0.666398

0.307349

0.606571

136,737

50/50

0.661588

0.303113

0.612761

137,304

30/60

0.662802

0.305335

0.614944

137,595

20/80

0.664967

0.306568

0.609735

137,700

60/40

0.660441

0.303024

0.615152

137,846

70/30

0.657206

0.302143

0.616542

139,152

90/10

0.656798

0.298275

0.619214

139,270

80/20

0.660142

0.304697

0.620422

139,408

As Table 1 shows, a 40/60 training/test split predicts few defaults,
although it does have a lower recall score than a traditional 80/20 split. On the
other hand, the 40/60 split has a higher accuracy score, although the differences
in error measured across various training/test splits are relatively small. In
essence, what this demonstrates is that a rating analyst could iterate through
various training and test combinations to find a split that leads the model to
predict fewer defaults.
2. Freedom in Model Selection
Another degree of freedom a rating analyst has in developing a
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predictive model is their choice of model. As we will see, model choice can have
a significant impact on the number of predicted defaults. Here, three models will
be examined: (1) logistic regression (from above); (2) a decision tree classifier,
which infers decision rules from the training data;5 2 and (3) a nearest neighbor
classifier, which predicts whether a loan will default by comparing the features of
the loan to its closest neighbor (based on mathematical similarity). Table 2
shows the predicted number of defaults for the hypothetical ABS as well as the
error metrics for each model trained and tested with a 40/60 split between
training and test data from the prior section:
TABLE 2: Comparison of Predicted Defaults and Error
Metrics for Various Predictive Models
Model

Accuracy

Precision

Recall

Predicted
Defaults

Logistic
ogisin

0.663726

0.305885

0.609709

136,721

Decision
Teeio
Tree

0.660490

0.304140

0.614082

139,270

Neighbr

0.724964

0.261549
IIII

0.247239

63,885

Regression

LNeighbor

*

Running the same data through each of these models indicates that the
nearest neighbor classifier predicts the fewest defaults in our hypothetical ABS.
The nearest neighbor model also has the virtue of a high accuracy, although it has
very poor recall. By contrast, logistic regression predicts more than twice as
many defaults than the nearest neighbor model, has much better recall, and thus a
much lower false negative risk (which, as a reminder, in this context means a
much lower risk of incorrectly identifying a bad loan as a good one).
The examples above demonstrate how two analyst degrees of freedom
can impact predicted defaults and the riskiness of a predictive model. It should
come as little surprise to readers with some background in quantitative methods
that inputs and model choice matter for predicting outcomes. But these are real
choices rating analysts face in model design. Indeed, a rating analyst is often
confronted with many more degrees of freedom in model design, including
correlation risk, cash flow analysis, and recovery expectation.

1.10 Decision Trees, SQKrT-LEARN, http://scikit-learn.org/stable/modules/tree.html. Note the
library I am using for the decision tree is Scikit-leam's decision tree classifier. There is some
variance in the output of the decision tree each time it is trained and the results of the decision tree
may not mirror the results in Table 2 if the code available on Github, supra note 46, is downloaded
and independently run.
52
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C. Evidence of Subjective Bias and a Taxonomy of Model Manipulation
The data and model selection scenarios explored here in Part III may
seem somewhat contrived, but they track the decisions rating agencies made in
designing models to rate RMBS and CDOs prior to the 2008 financial crisis.
Empirical studies by John Griffin and Dragon Yongjun Tang suggest one major
credit rating agency was biased towards finding fewer defaults in rating pre -cnsis
CDOs and that the same rating agency made subjective adjustments in certain
CDO deals to increase AAA tranche sizes. 53 A separate empirical study by the
same authors shows that dual-rated CDOs (i.e., CDOs rated by both Moody's and
Standard & Poor's) performed worse than CDOs rated by either Moody's or
Standard & Poor's ("S&P"), which suggests that Moody's and S&P, as rating
agencies, succumbed to competitive pressure and "relaxed" their criteria in dualrated deals.5 ' Though the authors of these studies suggest business interests may
have influenced rating agency decision making, the authors are ultimately
agnostic about rating agencies' true motives.
A far more sinister explanation of rating agency motives can be found in
the allegations of complaints filed by various law enforcement agencies against
the major rating agencies. For example, the Department of Justice ("DOJ") sued
S&P55 in 2013 for violating the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and
Enforcement Act of 1989 ("FIRREA").5 6 The Department of Justice alleged that
S&P falsely represented that they were not motivated by business interests in
developing its RMBS and CDO models. In particular, DOJ alleged that: (1) S&P
built its RMBS model on a small dataset of "first-lien, fixed rate, prime mortgage
loans,"5 7 and delayed updating its RMBS to include a larger data set of risky
mortgages that more accurately reflected the contents of the securities it was then
rating; and (2) in updating the default assumptions for the monte-carlo model
S&P then used to rate CDOs, an S&P executive cherry-picked the default
probabilities from two competing analytic proposals in order to have competitive
ratings in different CDO sectors.
DOJ's Complaint even included allegations that S&P employees
attempted to use NHST to expressly "fish" for business-friendly assumptions:

53 See John Griffin & Dragon Yongjun Tang, Did Credit Rating Agencies Make Unbiased
Assumptions on CDOs?, 101 AM. ECON. REV. 125 (2011); John Griffin & Dragon Yongjun Tang,
Did Subjectivity Play a Role in CDO CreditRatings?, 67 J. FIN. 1293, 1295-96 (2012).
54 John Griffin, Jordan Nickerson & Dragon Yongjun Tang, Rating Shopping or Catering? An
Examination of the Response to Competitive Pressurefor CDO CreditRatings, 26 REV. FIN. STUD.
2270, 2272-75 (2013).
5 See Complaint at ¶¶ 133-86, United States v. The McGraw-Hill Cos., Inc., No. CV 13-00779
(C.D. Cal. Feb. 4, 2013), 2013 WL 416293 [hereinafter DOJ Complaint].
56 Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act, Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat.
183 (1989).
5 DOJ Complaint, supra note 52, at ¶¶ 133 - 57.
58 See id. at ¶¶ 160-79.
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"The Old Way," characterized as a "One Way Street," worked
as follows: "To come up with PDs [Probabilities of Default] and asset
correlations in [S&P's CDO model], we look at our raw data and come
up with a statistical best fit.
When this does not meet our business
needs, we have to change our parameters ex-post to accommodate."
The presentation added: "Does this work [for] our rating business? If it
does not, need to tweak PDs."
The "New Way," characterized as a "Two Way Street,"
worked as follows: S&P "came up with a new methodology
emphasizing flexibility. We decide on a number of business friendly
[sic] PD matrices first." Then S&P used hypothesis testing to determine
59
whether the business friendly [sic] matrices were "reasonable."

The examples in DOJ's complaint go well beyond the researcher degrees
of freedom and fishing for statistical significance found in studies by behavioral
psychologists, and suggest S&P misrepresented the basis for its methodological
choices. Yet as Gelman and Loken persuasively argue,"o bad faith or explicit
fraud is not necessary for statistical modeling to be biased. One way to frame the
choices rating analysts face, and their potential motives, is with Gelman and
Loken's taxonomy of test procedures 6' modified to apply to model manipulation
by rating analysts:
1) Let Y be the output from a predictive model to rate debt. Y can be
multivariate and can measure defaults, probability of default, expected
loss or any other dependent variable a rating agency seeks to predict.
2) Let (p represent the features of the predictive model, which includes
model type (e.g., parametric or nonparametric regression, monte carlo),
input data, independent variables, correlation risk, and error terms.
3) Rating analyst degrees of freedom without "fishing": Y
P where
a different p would have been developed given different data; thus Y
- p where p is used in actual model development.
*-

4) "Fishing": computing Y - pj forj=1, . . ., J: that is, iterating across
J different p and choosing q that minimizes defaults.
5) "Fraud": pursuing the methods described above in #3 or #4 or
simply choosing an arbitrary p lying about the basis for the decision.

The distinction between the procedures outlined in options four and five
above is subtle and turns on a rating agency's justification for its methodological
choices. For example, if a rating agency represented the agency iterated across
different p and settled on the p that minimized predicted defaults based on
5

See id. at ¶¶ 190-91.

60 See generally Gelman & Loken, Garden ofForking Paths, supra note 4.
61

d. at 2.
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quantitative and qualitative judgments, the rating agency would be guilty of
fishing but not necessarily fraud. However, in terms of regulating to protect
against the sort of market upheaval that we saw in 2008 and onward, the
difference between methods four and five may not even matter. We want rules
that discourage a rating agency from abusing analyst degrees of freedom or
fishing for models that under-predict defaults even if the agency believes the
choices it is making are correct. Part IV examines the extent to which the
reforms in Dodd-Frank are effective at preventing the model manipulation
discussed in this Part.
IV. DODD-FRANK'S RATING AGENCY REFORMS
The rating agency reforms in Dodd-Frank were designed to change the
incentive structure in the ratings industry. Dodd-Frank sought to accomplish this
by subjecting rating agencies to increased regulatory oversight, mandating that
rating agencies make extensive disclosures about their methodologies, ratings
performance, and ratings action, and eliminating certain references to credit
ratings in federal law.62 Part IV examines whether these oversight and disclosure
reforms are effective at curbing subjective bias in model design and the extent to
which subjective bias is still a problem in the ratings industry. I conclude that
while Dodd-Frank imposes substantial costs on rating agencies for pursuing
quantitative strategies in bad faith, Dodd-Frank-as presently applied-has little
application when rating agencies are not unambiguously operating in bad faith.
A. Effectiveness of Increased Oversight
Dodd-Frank increased oversight over NRSRO's in two ways: (1) by
requiring that NRSRO's maintain specific internal policies and modify their
internal organization to minimize the impact of business interests on credit rating
analysis; and (2) by creating a new division within the SEC, the Office of Credit
Ratings ("OCR"), to ensure that NRSRO's maintain appropriate separation
between business and credit analysis.
Dodd-Frank's internal policy and
organizational mandates include the requirement that an NRSRO "establish
effective internal control structure governing implementation of and adherence to
policies, procedures, and methodologies for determining credit ratings." 63 Such
internal controls must include:
Controls reasonably designed to ensure that newly developed
methodology or proposed update to an in-use methodology is
subject to an appropriate review process (for example, by persons
See Dodd-Frank, Title IX, Subtitle C, §§ 931-939H (codified in scattered parts of the U.S.
Code).
63 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7(c)(3)(A).
62
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who are independent from the persons that developed the
methodology or methodology update) and to management approval
prior to the new or updated methodology being employed by the
[NRSRO] to determine ratings.64
Controls reasonably designed to ensure that newly developed
quantitative models proposed to be incorporated into a credit rating
methodology are evaluated and validated prior to being put into
use. 65

*

*

A prohibition against an NRSRO allowing a person who
participates in developing or approving procedures or
methodologies used for determining the credit rating, including
qualitative and quantitative models to participate in the sales or
marketing of a product or service of the NRSRO or a product or
service of an affiliate of the NRSRO, 66 or to be influenced by sales
or marketing considerations. 67
The requirement that each NRSRO designate a compliance officer
to ensure conflicts rules are adhered to and submit annual reports
to the SEC. 6 8

*

The requirement that each NRSRO have an independent board to
establish maintenance and enforcement of policies and procedures
related to determining credit ratings. 69

Dodd-Frank created OCR to regulate NRSRO's and ensure that
NRSRO's comply with the above.70 The OCR's primary enforcement power is
its ability to revoke NRSRO status. Pursuant to Dodd-Frank, the OCR can
revoke a rating agency's license for a particular class of securities if the rating
agency fails "to consistently produce ratings with integrity." 7 ' In determining
whether a rating agency has failed to produce ratings with integrity for a
particular class of securities, Dodd-Frank allows OCR to consider the accuracy of
an agency's ratings with respect to a class of securities. 7 2 Moreover, recent SEC
regulations expanded OCR revocation authority to allow OCR to revoke a rating
agency's license for failing to separate sales activities from marketing activities.7
To examine the effectiveness of increased oversight, it is helpful to
consider the application of these rules in a hypothetical OCR investigation.
Assume two different rating agencies implemented the ABS model described in
Part II and that OCR is investigating these agencies for compliance with Dodd§ 240.17g-8(d)(1)(i).
C.F.R. § 240.17g-8(d)(1)(v).
C.F.R. § 240.17g-5(c)(6), 5(c)(8)(i).
C.F.R. § 240.17g-5(c)(8)(ii).
U.S.C. § 78o-7(j).

64 17 C.F.R.

17
66 17
67 17
68 15
69 15
70 15
71 15
72 15
73 17
65

U.S.C.
U.S.C.
U.S.C.
U.S.C.

§ 780-7(t).
§ 78o-7(p)(1)(A)(i)-(iii).
§ 78o-7(d)(2)(A).
§ 78o-7(d)(2)(B).

C.F.R. § 240.17g-5(g).
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Frank. Assume also that the primary evidence OCR is relying on to determine
compliance with the rules are the following internal emails 7 4 from each rating
agency:
RATING AGENCY #1
To: executive@ratingagency1.com
From: quant(ratingagency1.com
Subject: Concerned about Training/TestSplit andModel Selection
I am deeply concerned about the direction we're headed with
the update to our beta ABS model. Iterating across training/test splits
to minimize projected defaults is completely indefensible. Moreover,
the accuracy of the model is measured against different test sets, so we
are not comparing apples to apples in evaluating the accuracy of
models trained on different data. In addition, though the nearest
neighbor model has the virtue of being accurate against our test data,
nearest neighbors has a tendency to be over-fit to the training data. I
really worry about the risk we may be letting into the market. We
should not let business interests prevent us from making defensible and
accurate predictions.
RATING AGENCY #2
To: executive@ratingagency2.com
From: quant@ratingagency2.com
Subject: Progresson ourABS beta
We are making strong progress on our ABS beta. We have
tested it using various training/test splits. Though 80/20 is a common
training/test ratio, given the unique data set we are working with, it is
not obvious that 80/20 is appropriate. Also, given the non-linearity of
the data, we think a nonparametric classifier such as nearest neighbor
makes the most sense. We continue to test but believe the ABS beta
will prove to be a useful model in our analysis.
The first email reflects a more explicit bias, suggesting Rating Agency 1
violated the terms of Dodd-Frank in developing its ABS model. First, the
quantitative analyst at Rating Agency 1 expressly identifies business interests as
affecting the agency's judgment ("[w]e should not let business interests prevent
us from making defensible and accurate predictions"). Thus, it would likely run
afoul of Dodd-Frank's firm prohibition against allowing quantitative analysts to
consider business interests, giving the director of OCR a clear basis to revoke the
agency's license to rate ABS. Second, the email may hint at a lack of appropriate
internal controls, board independence, and appropriate oversight by the agency's
designated compliance officer, which would warrant further investigation to
In the applied epistemology of regulatory investigations, few pieces of second order evidence
carry more empirical weight than emails.
74
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determine if ratings issued under prior ABS models by the agency lacked
integrity sufficient to warrant revocation of the agency's license.
The email from Rating Agency 2, however, is more ambiguous. The
analyst does not seem to be motivated by the agency's business interests but
rather the analyst's self-interest in delivering a product that is useful to the
business. In this sense, the analyst at Rating Agency 2 is like Beall and Tracy,
the researchers behind the menstrual cycle study discussed in Part II. Beall and
Tracy did not appear to be fishing for significance nor did they appear to be
obviously motivated by bad faith. Rather, as Gelman and Loken point out, Beall
and Tracy made a series of choices in data collection and hypothesis formulation
which increased the likelihood of finding a statistically significant result. 5 The

analyst at Rating Agency 2 may not be explicitly iterating across various training
and test splits or choosing nearest neighbors to minimize reported defaults.
These choices may appear deterministic to the ratings analyst. However, looking
at the entire "garden of forking paths" reveals that these choices may simply be
the product of subjective bias and, in effect, increase the likelihood the agency's
ABS model underestimates default risk.
Though the email from Rating Agency 2 does not appear to directly
implicate Dodd-Frank's separation of sales and marketing activities, it may
suggest a failure to have appropriate internal controls, which, in turn, could
reflect the rating agency's failure to have a truly independent board. The rules
themselves, however, do not provide clear guidance on this front. The
regulations implementing Dodd-Frank's internal control provisions require
appropriate review of proposed quantitative models and the proper vetting and
evaluation of active quantitative models. Using a peculiar training/test ratio and
a nonparametric model with a low recall score may suggest, in particular, poor
internal controls. On the other hand, as noted in Part III, these data and model
selection choices are relatively accurate with respect to overall errors even
though they are weak with respect to Type I errors as they have low recall scores.
The Dodd-Frank rules themselves do not provide clear guidance on what exactly
constitutes appropriate vetting and evaluation in this context.
Moreover, it is not immediately clear that these design decisions would
result in ratings with less "integrity." One could imagine in creating a model that
predicts few defaults, an analyst motivated by both self-interest while at the same
time concerned about making a model that significantly deviates from the
agency's prior and extant ratings. As noted in Part III, empirical studies have
shown that credit ratings migrate in the same direction in certain situations and
are biased towards the same kinds of errors. 6 In this sense, it is hard to see how
the director of OCR could conclude Rating Agency 2's model lacks integrity if it
is within a reasonable margin of error of the predictions of other agencies.
As I explain in Part V, Dodd-Frank gives the OCR flexibility in determining
1

Gelman & Loken, Garden ofForking Paths, supra note 4, at 9.

76 See Griffin, supra note 50.
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when ratings lack integrity and the OCR could issue interpretive guidance with
respect to Dodd-Frank's revocation provisions and internal control provisions to
give these provisions more teeth. In the absence of meaningful guidance, the
increased oversight mandated by Dodd-Frank may be too weak to prevent the
soft but no less dangerous bias in data selection and model choice that the email
from Rating Agency 2 suggests.
B. Effectiveness of Mandated Disclosures
Dodd-Frank mandates three important kinds of disclosure by rating
agencies: (1) disclosure of credit rating methodologies; (2) disclosures associated
with rating actions; and (3) disclosure of ratings performance.
Provisions
targeting transparency in rating methodology require both qualitative and
quantitative disclosures of credit rating methodologies.
The qualitative
disclosures must include:
*

The main assumptions and principles about correlation of default
across underlying assets;7

*

Potential limitations of the credit ratings, and the types of risks
excluded from the credit ratings that the rating agency does not
comment on;79

*

Information on the uncertainty of the credit rating, including: (1)
information on the reliability, accuracy, and quality of the data
relied on in determining the credit rating; and (2) a statement
relating to the extent to which data essential to the determination of
the credit rating were reliable or limited, including: any limits on
the scope of historical data; and any limits in accessibility to
certain documents or other types of information."

Additionally, the quantitative component requires that rating agencies
disclose information on the sensitivity of the rating to assumptions made by the
rating agency, including:
*

*

78

80

82

Five assumptions made in the ratings process that, without
accounting for any other factor, would have the greatest impact on
a rating if the assumptions were proven false or inaccurate;" and
An analysis, using specific examples, of how each of the five
assumptions identified impacts a rating.8 2

See 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7(s)(3).
15 U.S.C. § 78o-7(s)(3)(A)(ii).
15 U.S.C. § 78o-7(s)(3)(A)(iii).
15 U.S.C. § 78o-7(s)(3)(A)(iv).
15 U.S.C. § 78o-7(s)(3)(B)(iii)(I).
15 U.S.C. § 78o-7(s)(3)(B)(iii)(II).

2019]

RATING ANALYST DEGREES OFFREEDOM

357

Provisions concerning disclosure associated with rating actions require
that rating agencies disclose extensive information about the methodologies used
to rate a security, the quantitative and qualitative assumptions made, and the
reasons for the rating.83 In addition, SEC regulations promulgated under DoddFrank require the following with each rating action:
Attestation: The [NRSRO] must attach to the form a signed statement
by a person within the [NRSRO] stating that the person has
responsibility for the rating action and, to the best knowledge of the
person:
(A) No part of the credit rating was influenced by any business
activities;
(B) The credit rating was based solely upon the merits of the
obligor, security or money market instrument being rated; and
(C) the credit rating was an independent evaluation of the credit
risk of obligor, security or money market instrument.8 4
Though the disclosure provisions are not expressly enforceable, DoddFrank's passive reforms may expose rating agencies to unfair and deceptive acts
and practices ("UDAP") claims by state law enforcement to the extent a rating
agency makes a false or misleading disclosure. 5 State attorneys general relied
on such claims to sue NRSROs for alleged misconduct in rating RMBS and
CDOs prior to the financial crisis." In lawsuits filed against S&P and Moody's,
various state attorneys general alleged that S&P and Moody's represented to the
public that they were independent and objective in their analysis of RMBS and
CDOs, when in fact they were not. 7 Disclosures of methodologies and the
attestation required with each credit rating provide a clearer link between a
deceptive statement and misconduct than the general statement of independence
17 C.F.R. § 240.17g-7.
17 C.F.R. § 240.17g-7(a)(1)(iii).
85 See generally Mark Totten, Credit Reform and the States: The Vital Role of Attorneys-General
After Dodd-Frank, 99 IOWA L. REV. 115, 119-21 (2013) (discussing the evolution of consumer
protection laws, including the enactment of state UDAP laws).
86 See generally In re Standard & Poor'sRating Agency Litig., 23 F. Supp. 3d 378, 395 (S.D.N.Y.
2014) (summarizing UDAP claims brought against S&P and Moody's by state attorneys general in
the context of discussing federal jurisdiction over consolidated state law claims). The author was
involved in one such lawsuit, Illinois v. The McGraw-Hill Cos., Inc., No. 12 CH 02535 (Cir. Ct.
Cook Cnty. Jan. 25, 2012), as an assistant attorney general for the Illinois Attorney General.
Though this article draws from the author's experience in this litigation and a similar investigation
into the practices of Moody's, this article does not disclose any confidential or non-public
information gleaned from the author's participation. See Press Release, Illinois Att'y Gen.,
Madigan, DOJ & States Reach Settlement with Moody's for Misleading Investors in Lead Up to
Economic
Collapse
(Jan.
13,
2017),
http://www.illinoisattomeygeneral.gov/pressroom/2017_01/20170113b.html.
8 See In re Standard& Poor'sRatingAgency Litig., 23 F. Supp. 3d at 395.
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and objectivity state attorneys general relied on, thus potentially exposing a
rating agency to broader UDAP liability than before Dodd-Frank. Moreover,
state law enforcement officials have broad pre-discovery investigative powers
and would likely look to second-order evidence-such as internal emails-to
determine if rating agencies misled the public in disclosures about their
methodologies and ratings of securities.
As with Dodd-Frank's oversight reforms, it is useful to examine the
effectiveness of mandated disclosures with a hypothetical law enforcement
investigation. Using the example from the oversight discussion above, assume a
particular state attorney general is investigating the same two rating agencies to
determine if these agencies violated state UDAP in creating the ABS model from
Part III. Assume as well that the state attorney general is relying on the same
emails discussed in the previous section.
Turning to our two emails, we again see that the passive reforms in
Dodd-Frank are better suited to curb the explicit fraud suggested in the email
from Rating Agency 1 and not the implicit bias contained in the email from
Rating Agency 2. The rating analyst's express acknowledgement in the Rating
Agency 1 email that business interests affected model development would make
it difficult for a rating agency to make forthcoming public disclosures about the
qualitative and quantitative assumptions in their business models. Honest
disclosures would almost certainly leave the rating agency vulnerable to
revocation for failing to appropriately separate sales and marketing interests.
Dishonest disclosure, on the other hand, would expose the rating agency to state
UDAP liability for making false and misleading public statements. Though the
Rating Agency 1 email concerns development of a quantitative model, one could
imagine a similar email related to the rating of a security. In such a case, to the
extent the rating agency was attesting that its rating was free from the
consideration of business interests, the rating agency would be exposed, based on
the contents of the email, to clear liability under state UDAP laws.
The Rating Agency 2 email, on the other hand, again proves to be more
problematic. As this email appears to be the product of an honest but biased
analytic approach, a rating agency could be forthcoming about quantitative and
qualitative assumptions in its methodology without obviously running afoul of
state UDAP laws. Gelman and Loken's discussion of Beall and Tracy is again
useful here." Beall and Tracy did not perceive themselves as fishing for
statistical significance and disclosed vulnerabilities of their study. Similarly, a
rating agency that discloses its justification for using a curious training/test split
and a model that predicts few defaults is not necessarily being deceptive if it is
truly the product of a biased but honest intellectual inquiry. Moreover, if the
Rating Agency 2 email was related to the rating of a security as opposed to
model development, it seems plausible that a rating agency could truthfully attest
that the associated rating was not compromised by business interests. Thus,
" Gelman & Loken, Garden ofForking Paths, supra note 4, at 8-9.
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while the disclosure requirement may invite cleaner state UDAP claims when a
rating agency misleads the public about its methodologies and analysis of
individual securities, the passive reforms in Dodd-Frank are similarly illequipped to curb soft bias that may result in inaccurate credit ratings.
C. Is Subjective Bias Still a Problem in the Ratings Industry?
Dodd-Frank's oversight and disclosure provisions are insufficient to
address the problem of subjective bias in model design. An important question,
then, is whether the Dodd-Frank reforms aimed at reducing reliance on credit
ratings were effective at changing the incentive structure in the ratings industry in
such a way as to avoid the problematic influence of subjective biases. OCR's
annual examination reports have consistently found problems with NRSRO's
adherence to policies, procedures, and methodologies; management of conflicts
of interest; and internal supervisory controls.8 9 Moreover, recent scholarship
suggests these reforms have failed and that subjective bias remains a problem in
the ratings industry. For example, Frank Partnoy persuasively argues in a recent
paper that rating agencies continue to build seemingly arbitrary models that
likely underestimate default risk. 90 Recent empirical work bolsters Partnoy's
account by showing that rating agencies continue to use indefensibly low default
correlations in rating structured securities.91
Partnoy demonstrates plain weaknesses within the rating agencies'
current methodologies, although he does not suggest (and it is not obvious from
his work) that these weaknesses are the product of bad faith. Take for example
Partnoy's criticism of Standard & Poor's updated diversification criteria, which
"changed in a way to favor diversified conglomerate firms-and that disfavored
undiversified firms." 92 Partnoy notes that Standard & Poor's appears to have
taken the issue of diversification seriously after the financial crisis, but contends
that Standard & Poor's updated criteria rests on amorphous distinctions and
misinterprets the relevant literature on the value of diversification. 93 It is possible
that Standard & Poor's analytic justifications for its updated criteria are illusory
and Standard & Poor's was motivated by its interest to appease large
conglomerates. Yet it is equally plausible that Standard & Poor's updated
criteria was the product of well-meaning but misguided analysis. As an example,
assume that Standard & Poor's updated its diversification criteria based on its
truly held beliefs that diversification is strongly linked with low default risk.
OCR's sununary examination reports for each year since 2011 are available on the SEC's
website. See Reports and Studies, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N (Dec. 1, 2016),
http://www.sec.gov/ocr/ocr-reports-and-studies.html.
90 See Partnoy, Wrong, supra note 13, at 1450-68.
91 See John Griffin & Jordan Nickerson, Debt Correlationsin the Wake of the Financial Crisis:
What are AppropriateDefault Correlationfor StructuredProducts?, 125 J. FIN. ECON. 454 (2017).
92 Partnoy, Wrong, supra note 13, at 1460.
93 See id. at 1459-60.
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New research indicates that this view is not necessarily correct with respect to
conglomerates. Standard & Poor's, however, fails to appropriately update its
views on diversification based on its strong priors. Standard & Poor's new
criteria may be misguided, but it is certainly not the product of bad faith. My
central argument, however, is that Dodd-Frank, as presently applied, does little to
push agencies to eliminate the damaging impacts of subjective bias, and is only
useful where second-order evidence strongly implies bad faith. It would be
unlikely to protect against, or correctly assign blame after, these misguided
positions.
V. SOME MODEST REFORMS
Nearly a decade after the financial crisis, there is an emerging consensus
among legal scholars that the legislative reforms in Dodd-Frank are insufficient
to address the problems the rating agencies pose.9 4 Scholars contend that DoddFrank resulted in rules narrowly tailored to address past harms but inadequate to
resolve the structural problems that still plague the rating industry.95 Critics of
Dodd-Frank's reforms propose a number of a different legislative changes,
including banning the issuer-pays model in favor of a subscription-based model 9 6
and breaking up the rating agencies into smaller entities. 97
As a simple solution to the problem of subjective bias in model design,
the SEC could be allowed to audit rating agency models for design flaws.
Assuming we could draft rules that define what constitutes a design flaw (and
assuming the SEC would be capable of administering this standard), this solution
would contravene federal law, which prohibits rules "regulat[ing] the substance
of credit ratings or the procedures and methodologies by which any nationally

94 Id; Manns, Downgrading, supra note 5; Hill, Limits, supra note 13; Guo, CreditRating Agency
Reform, supra note 13.
9 See Maims, Downgrading, supra note 5, at 753 (arguing that while the SEC's increased oversight

may have curbed the most egregious abuses of the crisis, "[t]he most important part of [DoddFrank] remains the most unresolved: the SEC's mandate to design an alternative rating industry
business model to address the conflicts of interest created by debt issuers' selecting and paying
their rating agency gatekeepers"); Hill, Limits, supra note 13, at 133 (arguing that while Dodd-

Frank's solution is not necessarily bad, Dodd-Frank failed to address "why rating agencies gave
such inflated ratings to subprime securities"); Partnoy, Wrong, supra note 13, at 1408 (arguing that

Dodd-Frank failed to reduce reliance on credit ratings enough to overcome the "stickiness of
regulatory licenses").
96

See Hill, Limits, supra note 13, at 146 ("[t]he solution [to Dodd-Frank's problems] is to get away

from an 'issuer pays' model, in which those paying for ratings are the securities' sellers, and return
to 'subscriber pays,' in which ratings are paid for by people buying research as to securities'
quality"); but see Claire Hill, Why Did The Rating Agencies Do Such A Bad Job Rating Subprime
Securities, 71 U. PITT. L. REv. 585, 586 (2010) (arguing against mono-casual explanations of the

rating agencies' failures, including assigning exclusive blame to the issuer pays model, and casting
doubt on many proposed solutions to reform the ratings industry).
9

See Manns, Downgrading, supranote 5, at 801.
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recognized statistical rating organization determines credit ratings. "98 Reform
proposals such as switching to a subscription-based model or breaking up the
rating agencies into smaller units get around this federal prohibition by changing
the incentive structure in the ratings industry without explicitly regulating the
substance of credit ratings.
These proposals, however, suffer from two
problems.
First, each is hard to implement and would require significant
legislative action. Second, while these reforms have the virtue of potentially
minimizing the benefits of issuing biased ratings, neither increases the costs to
rating agencies of making well-intentioned mistakes. Put differently, it is naive
to assume rating agencies will build better and unbiased models absent rules that
punish rating agencies for building bad models.
To reform the credit rating industry, we want rules that force rating
agencies to internalize the costs of quantitative and analytical mistakes. Some
reform proposals attempt to accomplish this by linking rating agencies'
performance to pay. One such proposal involves compensating rating agencies
with rated debt to be distributed as the debt matures in an amount equal to
average discount rate of debt with same rating and maturity. 99 Another similar
proposal would require the three major rating agencies to contribute a portion of
their revenue to a performance bonus fund to be distributed periodically to the
best performing rating agency and used to subsidize a secondary rating market of
smaller players.ioo
Although these proposals each have the virtue of punishing rating
agencies for underestimating default risk, each would require legislative changes
that are unlikely in the current political environment."o
I offer a simpler
solution, which can be achieved within the framework of Dodd-Frank: liberalize
the NRSRO application process and revoke regulatory status over particular
classes of securities for the poorest performing rating agencies.
A. Decreasing Barriers to Entry
Increasing competition among rating agencies has long been a goal of
proponents of rating agency reform. Yet the current market for credit rating
remains highly concentrated. Since the enactment of Dodd-Frank in 2010, only
15 U.S.C. § 78o-7(c)(2).
" See Listokin & Taibleson, supra note 8, at 94.
100 See Robert Rhee, On Duopoly and Compensation Games in the Credit Ratings Industry, 108
Nw. U. L. REV. 85, 89 (2013) (proposing "to establish a mandatory pay-for-performance
compensation scheme in which a fixed percentage of accrued revenue is ceded to fund a
performance bonus").
101 One set of proposals I do not take up is the push to eliminate the federal licensing regime
entirely.
See, e.g., Flannery, Houston & Partnoy, supra note 7; Gretchen Morgenson, Should
Free Markets Govern the Bond Rating Agencies?, N.Y. TiMEs, May 6, 2017, at BUI (arguing
against keeping the current federal licensing scheme for rating agencies). Though I am sympathetic
to eliminating the federal licensing regime, there seems appetite to get rid of CRARA and, as such,
I devote little attention to these proposals in this article.
98
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one new firm has been granted NRSRO status, increasing the total current
number of NRSROs to ten. Figure 2 shows the market concentration for ABS
issuances from 2011-2016:
FIGURE 2: Asset Backed Security (ABS) Issuances (2011-2016)
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The small number of NRSROs and market concentration are notable for
two reasons. First, capital and data costs have been low since 2010. Firms can
raise equity capital relatively easily and debt financing is remarkably cheap. Not
only is capital cheap, but firms can acquire information for free or at low cost
from third-party data brokers and can then utilize powerful algorithms to analyze
the data at relatively low cost. Low capital and data costs have led to significant
growth in many industries that are heavily reliant on large capital infusions and
data analysis. For example, during the same period in which the rating agency
field only grew eleven percent, there has been significant growth in marketplace
lending, payment processing, and other banking technologies.
In this
environment, one would expect new rating agencies to emerge with novel ways
to analyze and rate debt offerings. Yet none have emerged, or at least none have
been granted regulatory licenses by the SEC.
See GITHUB, supra note 46 (source code for Figure 2 is available on the GitHub page). Figure 2
shows the number of new ABS ratings issued between 2011-2016 for each applicable NRSRO.
The data reflected in Figure 2 was culled from public reports NRSROs are required to make
available pursuant to 17 C.F.R. § 240.17g-7 as discussed in Part JJJ.B infra. The data used in
Figure 2 was based on the web scraper developed by Mark Joffe and Frank Partnoy to extract and
consolidate this information in a simpler format, which is discussed in their recent 2018 article. See
Mark Joffe & Frank Partnoy, Making CreditRatings Data PubliclyAvailable 1-2 (San Diego Legal
Studies, Paper No. 18-320, 2018), http://ssm.com/abstract=3103974.
102
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Second, the low number of rating agencies is not obviously a result of the
Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006 ("CRARA"),' 03 Dodd-Frank, or their
associated regulations. Neither CRARA nor Dodd-Frank require much from
NRSRO applicants beyond credit ratings measurement statistics, the applicant's
procedure and methodologies for determining ratings, the applicant's capacity to
comply with Dodd-Frank and its associated regulations, and written certification.
Section 78o-7 does provide that the SEC may deny an application if the applicant
"does not have adequate financial and managerial resources to consistently
produce credit ratings with integrity" and to "materially comply" with the
provisions of Dodd-Frank.' 04 However, it is not clear what a failure to
consistently produce credit ratings with integrity actually means.
Despite the relatively straightforward application provisions in CRARA
and Dodd-Frank, the current NRSRO application process is opaque and firms
have experienced substantial difficulty becoming a NRSRO. For example, EganJones applied for NRSRO status in 1998 but only received it in 2007.105
Similarly, R&R Consulting, a firm founded by former structured finance experts
at Moody's, has been trying to become a NRSRO since 2011.106 R&R
Consulting provides ratings to initial issuances and subsequent issues of
securities "trading in the second, or resale, market, after they are issued." 07
R&R Consulting suggests that one reason for the delay is the SEC's rigid
enforcement of the written certification requirement under CRARA. CRARA
requires that aspiring NRSRO provide at least ten written certifications from
"qualified institutional buyers,"108 a term of art in securities regulation that
generally refers to any regulated entity (as opposed to an individual) that can
invest in securities.1 09 Although CRARA requires ten letters from institutional
buyers, CRARA does not specify the form of the letters. Anne Rutledge, one of
the principals of R&R Consulting, however, suggests that in practice, the SEC is
rigid about the content of the letters:

103 Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-291, 120 Stat. 1327, 1327-39
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7 (2006)) (federal legislation creating the current licensing regime for
rating agencies).
104 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7(a)(2)(C)(ii)(I) (2018).
105

See EMILY MCCLINTOCK EKINS & MARK CALABRIA, CATO INST., POLICY ANALYSIS No. 704:

REGULATION, MARKET STRUCTURE, AND ROLE OF THE CREDIT RATING AGENCIES, at 21 (2012).

Moreover, once a rating agency obtains NRSRO status they may struggle to dislodge the heavy
market bias in favor of the existing rating agencies. For example, as Figure 2 shows, Kroll's Bond
Rating Agency has struggled to significantly penetrate the ABS market despite obtaining NRSRO
status in 2008.
106 See Gretchen Morgenson, On the Waiting List at the Debt-Rating Club, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10,
2013, at BUl.
107
108
1'0

See id.
15 U.S.C.

§ 78o-7(a)(2)(C)(i)

(2018).

See 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A(a) (2018) (defining qualified institutional buyer).
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Proof that you've done business with them is not enough; it says you
must have letters. And [the SEC] have a suggested text for the letter.
When we changed the text slightly they said it was not in conformity.1 10

The instructions to Form NRSRO available on the SEC's website suggest
some additional reasons why the SEC issues so few licenses. In its application,
the SEC requires NRSRO applicants to include as exhibits extensive information
on the performance of rated debt, including a transition and default matrix for
issued ratings,"' and information about the analytic assumptions and validity of
the applicant's procedures and methodologies for issuing ratings.
These
requirements suggest that the SEC gives a strong preference to applicants with a
history of issuing unlicensed ratings and that the SEC makes value judgments
about the integrity of an applicant's predictive models. Though the SEC is
strictly forbidden from ex post evaluation of an NRSRO's procedures and
methodologies, it appears to be using ex ante screening to prune methodologies
the SEC deems invalid.11 2 The costs of the SEC's screening (significant market
concentration and making firms prone to underestimate default risk) may
outweigh the benefits of the SEC's subjective rejection of methodologies it
deems unreliable." 3 Thus, a relatively straightforward administrative change to
decrease barriers to entry would be for the SEC to give little weight to an
applicant's ratings history or specific methodologies, and grant NRSRO status to
all applicants who can demonstrate a capacity to comply with the terms of
CRARA, Dodd-Frank, and its associated regulations.
B. A Market for Regulatory Status
Liberalizing the NRSRO application is, however, insufficient to fix what
actually ails the credit rating industry. Indeed, some scholars contend that
increased competition may encourage a rapid race to the bottom, as rating
agencies vie for issuer business by continually relaxing their ratings criteria. To
avoid this, the SEC should use its power under Dodd-Frank to revoke the licenses
of poor-performing rating agencies. The OCR can revoke a rating agency's
license for a particular class of securities if the rating agency fails "to
consistently produce ratings with integrity,"" 4 and, in determining whether a
rating agency has failed to produce ratings with integrity for a particular class of
securities, OCR can consider the accuracy of an agency's ratings with respect to
110 See Morgenson, supra note 101.
111 See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, FORM INSTRUCTIONS: APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION AS A
NATIONALLY RECOGNIZED STATISTICAL RATING ORGANIZATION (NRSRO), at 21.

There is some support in the literature that the SEC is, in fact, engaging in ex ante screening.
See Rhee, supra note 95, at 96 (noting that "fearing fly-by-night rating agencies, the SEC has
parsimoniously granted the NRSRO status").
113 But see id. at 96, 104 (defending the duopoly in the ratings market and the few licenses the SEC
issues).
114 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7(d)(2(A).
112
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a class of securities." 5 My proposal is simple: the SEC should propose rules that
define integrity and accuracy relative to the performance of other rating agencies
and revoke an agency's license for particular class of securities if its performance
is poor. There are two obvious complications with this proposal: (1) measuring
performance and (2) ensuring bond markets do not collapse. I take each in turn
below.
First, I suggest the OCR rank rating agencies at periodic intervals (e.g.,
quarterly or semi-annually) by the sum of the absolute difference between each
rating agency's weighted average expected loss forecast and the weighted
average actual loss for all outstanding securities of a particular class (e.g., ABS,
CMBS)." 6 Rating agencies with the larger sums (i.e., largest difference between
weighted average expected loss and weighted average actual loss) are ranked
below rating agencies with smaller sums. The OCR can then use a relegationlike system to temporarily revoke the licenses of the lowest ranked rating agency
for at least one subsequent period. I suggest expected loss as opposed to rating
grade to avoid rating agencies' gaming of the system by strategically
downgrading poorly performing securities at intervals when they face the lowest
risk of relegation.
Similarly, I suggest absolute difference instead of the
difference between average actual loss and expected loss to avoid allowing rating
agencies to game the system by underrating securities. Finally, I believe the
OCR should use weighted averages to account for the magnitude of mistakes
(i.e., small deltas for large issuances should be weighed equally or more than
large deltas for small issuances)."'
Second, to avoid bond markets collapsing when one or more large
NRSROs are suspended and to ensure that the new rules do not prejudice smaller
firms, the OCR should require that all NRSRO's with active licenses for a class
of securities provide expected loss forecasts for all issuances, regardless of which
company initially rated them. To facilitate this, the SEC must amend Rule 17g-5
to allow the free flow of information between rating agencies. Rule 17g-5
currently provides that an NRSRO that rates a structured finance security and is
paid by the issuer must provide sufficient information to other NRSROs such that
they can rate the same debt."'
There are important qualifications that limit the application of Rule 17g5. First, it only applies to NRSROs paid by issuers and does not apply to
NRSROs who are compensated via subscription or any other method. Second,
15 U.S.C. § 78o-7(d)(2)(B)(i).
Put more technically, my proposal calls for treating expected loss forecasts like a multivariable
regression problem and ranking rating agencies based residual sum of squares to actual expected
loss. This is not to suggest that we use sum of squares to the exclusion of other measures, but
simply to offer one way to measure performance.
' To be sure, I am not wed to measuring accuracy with default performance and open to other
measures scholars have suggested such as bond or swap spreads. See, e.g., Flannery, Houston
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Partnoy, supra note 7.
118 See 17 C.F.R. § 240.17g-5(a)(3).
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requesting NRSROs can only access the information if they have rated at least
ten percent of the structured securities for which they requested information in
the prior calendar year. Third, requesting NRSROs are limited to ten requests
per year. The SEC should amend Rule 17g-5 to apply to all securities and allow
NRSROs access to this information without the limitations above.
To be sure, the solutions above do not resolve all implementation issues.
There are still open and important questions, including: how securities of the
same class but with different maturities are treated; whether a rating agency has
any recourse to fight suspension; what happens if all rating agencies do a poor
job; and whether the SEC should wait to propose these rules until there are
enough NRSROs to avoid significant disruptions to bond markets from the
temporary suspension of one or more large NRSROs. I do not mean to suggest
that any of these proposals is necessary or adequate to improve rating
performance; instead, I offer them to illustrate how the SEC might build a system
that would incentivize NRSRO's to compete over accurate ratings as opposed to
fees.

VI. CONCLUSION
The explicit goal of rating agency reform was originally to curb
perceived abuses by rating agencies prior to the financial crisis. Implicitly,
however, the goal of rating agency reform was to create incentives for rating
agencies to issue reliable ratings that help steer the efficient allocation of capital
in debt markets. This article's central contention is that it is difficult to achieve
better outcomes in rating analysis without first confronting subjective bias in
model design. Liberalizing the NRSRO application process and strengthening
the NRSRO revocation standards are changes the SEC can implement through
formal rulemaking and informal guidance, which may help mute the soft and
dangerous bias that likely continues to afflict the credit ratings market.

